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Abstract 
Several studies have demonstrated that in the mental health domain, experience does 
not always lead to better diagnostic decisions, suggesting that in clinical psychology 
experience-based intuition might actually not improve performance. The aim of the 
current study was to investigate differences in preferred reasoning styles of novice 
and experienced clinical psychologists as possible explanation of this surprising 
phenomenon. We investigated clinical and control decisions of novice (n = 20) and 
experienced (n = 20) clinical psychologists as well as age-matched controls (n = 20 
and n = 20 respectively) by using vignettes and MouselabWeb matrices. We assessed 
their reasoning style preferences by using the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini 
& Epstein, 1999). Results showed that experienced and novice clinical psychologists 
did not differ in diagnostic accuracy and that experienced psychologists had a higher 
preference for rational thinking than novices. We also found that in experienced psy-
chologists a stronger preference for deliberation was associated with greater accuracy, 
and in novice psychologists a stronger preference for intuitive reasoning was associated 
with less accurate decisions. It might be that it is not a question of more experience but 
of deliberation about the task that could help clinicians perform more accurately. 
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1. Introduction 
When people in psychological distress seek a diagnosis, they often prefer more expe-
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rienced clinical psychologists; however, counter-intuitively, this may not always be wise 
(Tracey et al., 2014; Shanteau, 1992). While it is self-evident that clinical psychologists 
who have worked longer in the field gain more experience, it has also been shown that 
they do not necessarily gain more expertise in psychodiagnostic decision-making 
(Spengler et al., 2009; Vollmer et al., 2013): Even after years of experience, clinical psy-
chologists are relatively poor at categorizing mental disorders into DSM categories 
(Brailey et al., 2001; Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2015) and make judgments strikingly 
similar to those of novices (e.g., Ægisdóttir et al., 2006; Garb, 1998; Strasser & Gruber, 
2004; Witteman & Van den Bercken, 2007).  
Two possible explanations for this phenomenon have been suggested. One is a task 
effect (Shanteau, 1992; Shanteau & Weiss, 2014; Tracey et al., 2014). In a “wicked” 
learning environment (Hogarth, 2001) such as the clinical domain, where decisions are 
based on uncertain, incomplete knowledge and without feedback, it is hard to learn 
from experience and improve performance. The other explanation is that the reasoning 
style on which experienced clinical psychologists rely does not fit the task (Tracey et al., 
2014). In our paper we focus on the second explanation.  
As experience increases, professionals tend to move from the deliberative, detail- 
oriented processing of the beginner, to faster, more automated information processing 
(Betsch & Haberstroh, 2005; Elstein & Schwartz, 2002; Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). 
Epstein (e.g., 2010) uses the terms “experiential/intuitive” versus “rational/analytical” 
to refer to these different ways of processing information. Experienced clinical psy-
chologists may thus diagnose more intuitively, quickly matching client presentations to 
prototypes (Westen, 2012). However, the benefit of greater experience, demonstrated in 
many other fields of expertise (Ericsson, 2009; Quińones et al., 1995), is offset in the 
mental health domain by using a less suitable reasoning style, explaining why more ex-
perienced psychologists are not more diagnostically accurate than novices. 
Preferred reasoning styles have been found to be associated with differences in diag-
nostic accuracy, but the link to experience has not been established. In one study (Aarts 
et al., 2012), clinical psychologists were grouped in terms of diagnostic accuracy, with 
lower accuracy related to stronger preferences for rational thinking. 
In our study we employed two formats for making clinical decisions: i) brief text 
vignettes and ii) MouselabWeb matrices (Schulte- Mecklenbeck et al., 2011), a process 
tracing tool providing information about both how long and how often cues are in-
spected. We also included control vignettes and matrices, and recruited age-matched 
participants from other fields of expertise to control for age and the domain-specificity 
of the effects. 
Hypotheses. 
Outcome hypothesis. We expected to find no differences in psychodiagnostic accu-
racy between novices and experienced clinical psychologists on the clinical tasks (cf. 
Spengler et al., 2009); and we expected clinical psychologists to perform better than 
control participants on the clinical tasks, as these required domain specific knowledge.  
Style hypothesis. We expected experienced clinical psychologists to report a stronger 
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preference for experiential processing than novice psychologists (cf. Betsch & Haber-
stroh, 2005). Additionally, because the environment does not allow learning from ex-
perience (Tracey et al., 2014), more experience would not be associated with higher ac-
curacy, and a stronger preference for rational processing would be related to higher 
accuracy. 
Processing hypothesis. We expected experienced clinical psychologists to be more 
intuitive and quicker in their decision-making (Westen, 2012), especially on the clinical 
tasks, than both novice psychologists and control participants.  
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Twenty novice (18 females) and 20 experienced clinical psychologists (14 females) par-
ticipated in this study. Novices were Master students in clinical psychology or young 
professionals, with a mean of 3 months of experience (SD = 3.2 months) and an average 
age of 25.3 years (SD = 3.83 years). Experienced clinical psychologists had a mean of 
15.6 years of experience (SD = 11.4 years) and with an average age of 42.9 years (SD = 
13.1 years).  
Novice clinical participants were recruited at two universities, with similar clinical 
psychology curricula. Experienced clinical participants were recruited through the 
membership list of their professional organization. 
Additionally, we recruited forty age-matched control participants. Twenty (14 fe-
male) were Master students or young professionals in a field other than mental health, 
with an average age of 23.6 years (SD = 3.21 years). The other twenty (12 females) con-
trols, for the experienced group, had an average age of 43.3 years (SD = 11.8 years).  
All participated in the study from home using their computers. Eight gift certificates 
(each worth €25) were raffled among the 80 participants.  
2.2. Procedure  
This study was part of a larger project addressing the effects of experience on clinical 
decision-making, which also included a memory and a triad task (cf. Bowers et al., 
1990). In the first session participants were asked to read a twenty-line case description, 
and then completed the vignette task and the MouselabWeb matrices (described be-
low). In the next part participants completed the triad task, where they had to judge 
whether triples of words were coherent or incoherent. In the second session, two weeks 
later, participants were asked to write down everything they remembered about the case 
description, and they completed the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; see below). 
Here we focus on relationship between thinking style preferences and diagnostic accu-
racy and therefore describe the results of the Vignettes, the MouselabWeb matrices, and 
the REI. 
Psychodiagnostic tasks. All psychodiagnostic tasks, both vignettes and Mouselab-
Web matrices, used criteria taken from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
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Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Each task required 
participants to indicate which of two DSM-IV-TR diagnoses best fit the case informa-
tion. There were always eight pieces of information. 1 - 4 pieces of information was di-
agnostic (i.e., defining) for one but not for the other diagnosis. The remaining pieces of 
information were non-specific for either of the two diagnoses. For instance, in a task 
with the diagnostic choices major depressive disorder and dysthymic disorder, infor-
mation that symptoms have been present only for the last month is defining for major 
depressive disorder, while that of low energy can typically occur in both disorders. Dif-
ferent pieces of information and diagnoses were used in each task, using a total of 90 
unique clinical tasks (45 vignette format, 45 MouselabWeb format).  
The control tasks concerned general knowledge about countries, food, and animals 
and were constructed in the same way as the clinical tasks (i.e., eight pieces of informa-
tion and two possible answers). The control tasks were piloted and difficulty matched 
using a different group of young and older volunteers.  
Vignettes. The vignettes were short text descriptions of the eight pieces of informa-
tion, followed by the two possible diagnostic labels. Control vignettes were in the same 
format, with 15 about countries, 15 about food, and 15 about animals. The cases pre-
sented using vignettes were different from those presented via MouselabWeb.  
MouselabWeb matrices. In the MouselabWeb matrices (Willemsen & Johnson, 
2011, see Figure 1), participants first saw eight closed grey boxes and two diagnostic 
labels. Hovering the mouse over a box revealed the information in that box, while 
moving it away closed the box again. Thus, participants saw only one piece of informa-
tion at a time. Participants were instructed to inspect the information, without time- 
constraints, and were not required to open all eight boxes. They indicated a decision by 
clicking on one of the labels. Participants completed 45 clinical and 45 control Mouse-
labWeb matrices, the latter comprising 15 tasks about countries, food, and animals, re-
spectively. Tasks were presented to all participants in the same order. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of clinical (left) and control (right) MouselabWeb matrices. 
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The MouselabWeb software allowed us to measure accuracy (correct or incorrect), 
the number of opened boxes (number of acquisitions), and the time spent on each task. 
Thinking style questionnaire: The Rational-Experiential Inventory. Participants 
also completed the Dutch version (see Witteman, van den Bercken, Claes, & Godoy, 
2009) of the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). This 40 item 
self-report measure examines information processing mode preferences, with answers 
loading on two independent dimensions: intuitive-experiential (REI-E: 20 items, e.g., “I 
believe in trusting my hunches”; α = 0.89) and analytical-rational (REI-R: 20 items, e.g., 
“I enjoy intellectual challenges”; α = 0.88). Participants score each item on a 5-point 
scale, from 1 (completely false) to 5 (completely true). Higher scores indicate stronger 
self-reported preference to use the respective thinking style.  
The design of the study was as presented in Figure 2. 
3. Results 
3.1. Rational Experiential Inventory 
To assess differences between the four groups in their thinking style preferences, two 2 
(experience) x 2 (profession) Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were performed (one 
ANOVA for rational style, one for experiential). There were no significant differences 
between novices and experienced participants (F (1, 76) = 1.65, p = 0.20) and clinicians 
and controls (F (1, 76) = 0.44, p = 0.84) in their rational style preference. However, the 
profession/experience interaction was significant (F (1, 76) = 5.25, p < 0.05). Tukey’s 
HSD comparisons indicated a significant difference only between the novice clinical 
psychologists and the other three groups (p < 0.05): Novice psychologists had a lower 
preference than the other groups for the rational thinking style. No differences were 
found between novices and experienced participants (F (1, 76) = 1.67, p = 0.21) and cli-
nicians and controls (F (3, 76) = 0.401, p = 0.53) in experiential style preference (Table 
1). The interaction between profession and experience level was also not significant (F 
(1, 76) = .209, p = 0.65). 
 
 
Figure 2. Study design. 
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Table 1. Mean scores (SDs) of the Rational-Experiential 
 
Experiential Style Rational Style 
Novices Experienced Novices Experienced 
Clinical psychologists 3.43 (0.45) 3.34 (0.67) 3.71 (0.54) 4.10 (0.53) 
Controls 3.4 (0.34) 3.08 (0.61) 4.13 (0.39) 4.00 (0.47) 
The scale ranges from 1 to 5. 
3.2. Analysis Strategy 
To investigate the role of experience level (novice/experienced), profession (clinical 
psychologist/control), question type (clinical/non-clinical), and their potential interac-
tions on diagnostic decisions, we used a (generalized) linear-mixed effects models ap-
proach (sometimes also referred to as multilevel models or hierarchical linear models) 
that can account for non-independence in the data (for example, due to the fact that 
each participant contributed more than 1 data point). This approach has several ad-
vantages compared to more traditional analysis approaches, as it allows analysis of data 
at the trial level (thus making it unnecessary to aggregate across items or participants) 
while safeguarding against inflated Type I errors by modeling all relevant potential 
sources of variation and taking into account the non-independence. We used the lme4 
package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) in R (R Core Team, 2013) for the 
mixed-models analysis. To determine p-values for the effects of interest based on Like-
lihood Ratio Tests (comparing the model with the effect of interest to the same model 
without the effect of interest), we used the mixed function from the package afex ver-
sion 0.15 - 2 (Singmann, Bolker, & Westfall, 2014). 
As a general modeling strategy, we always first ran an omnibus model containing all 
predictors and interaction terms of interest (experience level, profession, vignette type, 
and their interactions), and then ran follow-up models to further investigate significant 
interactions and/or main effects of interest. 
For the vignettes analysis (as for the MouselabWeb), experience level, profession, 
vignette type, and their interactions were modeled as fixed effects, and participants and 
item were modeled as random intercepts. Vignette type was added as random slopes 
varying over participants, and experience level and profession were added as random 
slopes varying over item; in addition, the model contained all possible random correla-
tion terms among the random effects. This represents a “maximal” random effects 
structure that both accounts for the repeated-measure nature of the data and avoids in-
flated Type 1 errors (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013).  
For the vignettes data, we first present the analysis of accuracy (correct or incorrect 
response), using a generalized mixed-effects models approach appropriate for the bi-
nary data, followed by the analysis of response times, which used a Gaussian model. 
The same analysis was done for the MouselabWeb data. An additional model used the 
number of acquisitions as an independent variable. Finally, within each such analysis, 
we first present the results of the models without REI scores (representing tests of our 
outcome hypotheses), followed by the same models with REI scores added (represent- 
ing tests of our style hypotheses). 
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3.3. Vignettes-Outcome and Style 
There were no significant main effects of experience level (χ2(1) = 0.52, coeff = −0.044, 
p = 0.47, CI95% [−0.17, 0.08]), vignette type (χ2(1) = 0.02, coeff = −0.022, p = 0.89, 
CI95% [−0.35, 0.26]) nor interaction between profession and experience level (χ2(1) = 
1.49, coeff = 0.21, p = 0.22, CI95% [−1.25, 0.17]) on accuracy (model fit: BIC = 5435; 
AIC = 5516). Clinical psychologists exhibited overall greater accuracy than controls 
(χ2(1) = 4.19, coeff = 0.143, p < 0.05, CI95% [0.001, 0.29]). The follow-up models 
showed that psychologists were significantly more accurate than controls only in clini-
cal vignettes (χ2(1) = 21.6, coeff = 0.536, p < 0.001; CI95% [0.31, 0.76]). Clinical psy-
chologists and controls did not differ in accuracy in control vignettes (χ2(1) = 1.14, 
coeff = 0.025, p = 0.89; CI95% [−0.11, 0.4]; see Table 2).  
Response time showed a negative relationship with accuracy in all groups and in 
both vignette types; the longer participants took to solve tasks, the less accurate they 
were (χ2(1) = 7.81, coeff = −0.301, p < 0.01; CI95% [−1.45, −0.58]).  
The observed results are consistent with our outcome hypothesis: Experienced and 
novice clinical psychologists did not differ in accuracy on the clinical vignettes. 
With respect to our Style hypothesis, the following interactions were significant in 
the same model as above, but with thinking styles added (model fit: BIC = 5624; AIC = 
5434): the three-way interaction between RAT, experience, and profession (χ2(1) = 
8.62, coeff = 0.24, p < 0.01, CI95% [0.17, 0.32]); the three-way interaction between ex-
perience level, vignette type, and EXP score (χ2(1) = 8.24, coeff = 0.15, p < 0.05, CI95% 
[0.15, 0.41]); and the four-way interaction between RAT, profession, vignette type, and 
experience (χ2(1) = 6.51, coeff = 0.16, p = 0.01, CI95% [0.52, 0.91]). Follow-up models 
demonstrated that there was no relationship between EXP and accuracy (χ2(1) = 0.01, 
coeff = −0.001, p = 0.99, CI95% [−0.44, 0.37]) in experienced clinical psychologists, 
whereas in novices, EXP scores were negatively related to accuracy (χ2(1) = 8.16, p < 
0.01, coeff = −0.71, CI95% [−1.27, −0.12]; Figure 3, left). In contrast, the RAT score 
was related to accuracy with experienced, but not novice, psychologists (χ2(1) = 9.71, 
coeff = 0.556, p < 0.01; CI95% [0.71, 1.42]; χ2(1) = 3.6, coeff = 0.21, p = 0.06, CI95% 
[−0.94; 0.04]; see Figure 3, right).  
For descriptive reasons (to present the relationships in a measure more familiar to 
most readers than the coefficients in the mixed-effect models) Pearson correlations  
 
Table 2. Mean accuracy percentages. 
 
Vignettes MouselabWeb matrices 
Clinical 
questions 
Control 
questions 
Clinical 
questions 
Control 
questions 
Clinical 
psychologists 
Novices 82 78 80 81 
Experienced 83 79 80 83 
Controls 
Novices 75 80 71 82 
Experienced 69 81 65 82 
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Figure 3. Association between experientiality (EXP) and accuracy (left) and rationality (RAT) 
and accuracy (right) for novice and experienced psychologists in vignettes. Accuracy score is the 
percentage of correct answers. Experientiality and rationality scores were analyzed as continuous 
variables but are, for illustrative purposes, presented as binary variables 
 
were computed between REI scores and accuracy of both novice and experienced clini-
cians. As in the mixed-models analysis, higher experiential scores were negatively cor-
related with the mean accuracy of novice (r = −0.626; p < 0.01) but not experienced cli-
nicians (r = −0.096; p = 0.69); higher rational scores were positively correlated with the 
mean accuracy of experienced (r = 0.457; p < 0.05) but not novice clinicians (r = 
−0.278; p = 0.24).  
There were no significant interactions between EXP and RAT and other variables in 
the control group or in control tasks (all p > 0.08). 
3.4. Vignettes-Processing Time 
To investigate whether the four groups differed in task completion time, we used a 
similar modelling approach as for accuracy, with a dependent variable of duration (in 
sec, log transformed) of each task, and we used the lmer instead of the glmer function. 
As with accuracy, there were no significant main effects of experience level (χ2(1) = 
0.4, coeff = 0.01, p = 0.53, CI95% [−0.05, 0.06]) or profession (χ2(1) = 0.69, coeff = 0.01, p 
= 0.41, CI95% [−0.05, 0.07]) on vignette duration. The results did not support the proc-
essing hypothesis, as no differences emerged between novice and experienced clinicians 
in the task duration for the vignette tasks.  
3.5. MouselabWeb-Outcome and Style 
The results of the MouselabWeb matrices were consistent with those of the vignettes 
(model fit: BIC = 6362; AIC = 6219). There was no significant main effect of experience 
level (χ2(1) = 0.02, coeff = 0.9, p = 0.9, CI95% [−0.11, 0.13]) on accuracy (Table 2, third 
and fourth column). Clinicians exhibited greater accuracy overall than controls (χ2(1) 
= 11.93 , p < 0.001, CI 95% [0.09, 0.26]); and control question type was associated with 
greater accuracy (χ2(1) = 6.72 , p = 0.01, CI 95% [−0.59, −0.09]). These effects were 
qualified by a significant interaction between profession and question type (χ2(1) = 
30.87, p < 0.001, CI 95% [0.1, 0.23]). Follow-up models demonstrated no difference 
between the groups on control questions (χ2(1) = 0.01, p = 0.93, CI 95% [−0.16, 0.18]), 
but clinicians were significantly more accurate than controls on the clinical questions 
A. Skvortsova et al. 
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(χ2(1) = 32.97, p < 0.001, CI 95% [0.22, 0.49]). 
Time spent solving the matrices had a negative effect on accuracy for both groups 
and in both matrix types: Longer times were associated with less accuracy (χ2(1) = 
37.88, coeff = −0.28, p < 0.001, CI95% [−0.65, −0.46]). 
Adding REI scores to the model we again found an effect that was specific for clinical 
psychologists in their field of expertise (model fit: BIC = 6203; AIC = 5498): in novice 
clinical psychologists, a stronger preference for an EXP style was associated with lower 
accuracy (χ2(1) = 5.49, coeff = −0.28, p = 0.02, CI95% [−0.78, −0.34]), while in experi-
enced psychologists a stronger preference for RAT was associated with higher accuracy 
(χ2(1) = 4.39, coeff = 0.16, p = 0.04, CI95% [0.66, 1.74]).  
As for the vignettes, we present correlations for purely descriptive purposes. Higher 
experiential scores were negatively correlated with the accuracy of novice (r = −0.472; p 
< 0.05) but not of experienced clinicians (r = 0.121; p = 0.61); higher rational scores 
were positively correlated to the mean accuracy of experienced (r = 0.457; p < 0.05) but 
not novice clinicians (r = −0.331; p = 0.15). 
3.6. MouselabWeb-Processing Time and Acquisitions 
Only one main effect was significant in the omnibus model with time: Response times 
differed significantly between task types (χ2(1) = 13.05, coeff = 0.09, p < 0.001, CI95% 
[0.04, 0.14]). All participants took longer to complete the clinical than the control tasks.  
Only one significant main effect was found in the model with acquisitions: Task type 
was associated with number of acquisitions. All participants had more acquisitions in 
the clinical than in the control tasks (χ2(1) = 41.67, coeff = 1.19, p < 0.001, CI95% [0.86, 
1.55]). All other main effects and interactions were non-significant (all p’s > 0.21) (see 
Table 3). 
4. Discussion 
This study investigated the association between thinking style preferences and accuracy 
of psychodiagnostic classifications made by novice and experienced clinical psycholo-
gists. 
First, both with vignettes and with MouselabWeb we replicated previous research 
showing that experience does not influence the accuracy of psychodiagnostic decisions 
(cf. Spengler et al., 2009): novices and experienced clinical psychologists did not differ 
in their accuracy in diagnostic tasks. Clinical participants were more accurate than  
 
Table 3. Mean number of acquisitions (SDs) in MouselabWeb matrices 
 
Clinical psychologists Controls 
Novices Experienced Novices Experienced 
Clinical tasks 12.27 (5.69) 13.26 (6.28) 12.11 (6.05) 12.42 (5.13) 
Control tasks 9.66 (5.36) 10.06 (4.69) 10.51 (5.82) 10.3 (5) 
The number of acquisitions indicates how many boxes were opened on average per task. 
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control participants on the clinical tasks, and performed equally well on the control 
tasks.  
Secondly, and contrary to our hypothesis, novice and experienced clinical psycholo-
gists did not differ in self-reported preference for an experiential thinking style, while 
novice psychologists had a lower self-reported preference for a rational thinking style 
than the other groups.  
Thirdly, we demonstrated that preferred thinking style was associated with diagnos-
tic accuracy in different ways across groups. In novice psychologists, stronger prefer-
ences for experiential thinking were associated with lower accuracy, while in experi-
enced psychologists, a stronger preference for rational thinking was related to greater 
accuracy. This effect was found in both task formats. We thus did not replicate the 
finding that a preferred rational thinking style is negatively associated with accuracy 
(Aarts et al., 2012). Instead, we found a more complex pattern, such that in experi-
enced, but not novice clinical psychologists, the association between rational style and 
accuracy was positive rather than negative. Importantly, the current study employed a 
more extensive design than Aarts et al. (2012)—2 vs. 45 vignettes plus 45 MouselabWeb 
matrices—and hence our findings are likely more reliable. It should be noted though 
that here we define “experienced” psychologists as those with four or more years of ex-
perience while Aarts et al. (2012) criterion was a minimum of ten years practise. Since 
our sample contained too few participants with this experience level, and because of the 
large difference between the novices and the experienced psychologists in years of ex-
perience, we could not use experience as a continuous measure.  
Our results do not support the explanation that experience does not affect psychodi-
agnostic accuracy because experienced clinical psychologists prefer to use intuition 
more than novices. On the contrary: Experienced clinical psychologists did not report a 
stronger preference for experiential reasoning than novices. They may realize that the 
clinical environment is not predictable, but is, in Hogarth’s terms “wicked” (Hogarth, 
2001), and that they have not had an opportunity to learn (cf. Kahneman & Klein, 
2009). No educated intuition seems achievable in this task; clinicians do not engage in 
deliberate practice and they lack accurate feedback (Tracey et al., 2014). A novice’s in-
tuition is uninformed and therefore not conducive to accuracy, which can explain that 
preferring to use intuition does not help novices be more accurate.  
Finally, we found that experienced clinical psychologists were not faster than novices; 
they were either equally fast (in the vignettes) or slower (in the MouselabWeb matri-
ces). This ties in with the conclusions regarding thinking style preferences: Experienced 
psychologists do not prefer to use experience-based reasoning more than novices. Not 
being faster may be an age-effect, since experienced participants, both clinical and con-
trol, took longer to complete the tasks than the younger participants. A conclusion is 
that there are no processing differences between novice and experienced participants, at 
least not with the measures used here. In our sample, more experience in psychodiag-
nosis did not lead to more automatic processing of diagnostic information. 
There are a few limitations that have to be addressed. First, there is a questionable 
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relationship between self-report of thinking strategy and actual strategy use (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002). Higher REI scores indicate a stronger preference for, but 
not necessarily actual use of, the respective thinking style. However, previous studies 
demonstrated that REI scores do correlate with performance on tasks that have heuris-
tic-intuitive or reasoned-rational solutions (Witteman et al., 2009).  
Another limitation to this study was that the tasks employed were quite easy (average 
correct responses over 80%). Future research might profit from using only the more 
difficult tasks. One can argue that the tasks used are somewhat artificial, more than 
asking clinicians to interact with an actor-client (Groenier, Beerthuis, Pieters, Witte-
man, & Swinkels, 2011), and do not mimic actual psychodiagnosis. While in practice 
diagnostic decision-making indeed does not involve a binary choice, diagnostic classi-
fication is a sub-task that needs to be performed before treatment can start and entails 
clustering the presented symptoms into a disorder label. We used forced-choice tasks to 
allow us to see which symptom(s) were judged as diagnostic of the presented disorders. 
As done previously (e.g. Witteman & Van den Bercken, 2007) vignettes were used to 
optimize methodological rigor (cf. Bachmann et al., 2008); this greater methodological 
rigor, however, comes at the cost of the ability to generalize our results to more realistic 
diagnostic situations. 
Finally, though our sample size is typical for this kind of study, increasing the num-
ber of participants would increase the confidence that our results generalize to the lar-
ger population of clinical psychologists. 
5. Conclusion 
The results of the current study indicate that a preference for deliberative thinking is 
associated with better clinical decision-making, but only for experienced clinical psy-
chologists. For novice psychologists, preferring experiential or intuitive processing is 
associated with poorer clinical decision-making. We conclude that deliberating about a 
psychodiagnostic classification serves even the more experienced clinical psychologists, 
while novices should not trust their intuition. Our results might be used to inform the 
training of clinical psychologists. Prospective clinical psychologists should be aware of 
the impact of their thinking style on their diagnostic accuracy, and be encouraged to 
deliberate and to question their intuition. 
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